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NATIONALISM, GEOPOLITICS, AND NAVAL  
EXPANSIONISM
From the Nineteenth Century to the Rise of China
Robert S. Ross
 There is perhaps no more momentous great-power strategic decision, short of launching a war, than to develop a power-projection, war-winning mari-
time capability—thereby challenging, and risking heightened conflict with, an 
established maritime power� The likely costs of such a decision should caution 
the rising power against pursuing expansive naval ambitions� Such costs include 
the long-term costs of building the requisite number of surface ships that possess 
the advanced engineering and military capabilities necessary to enable maritime 
security; of diverting resources from other pressing territorial-defense and do-
mestic demands; of suffering the predictable societal, economic, and security 
impacts of heightened and protracted great-power conflict; of preparing for the 
possibility of great-power war; and ultimately, perhaps, of losing a great-power 
war�
Despite these generalized risks entailed in pursuing destabilizing maritime 
capabilities, and frequently despite particular risks inherent to their insecure 
geopolitical circumstances and interior borders, many great powers have pur-
sued extensive great-power maritime capabilities� In the past two hundred years, 
France twice challenged British maritime hegemony� The United States initiated 
its effort to develop global maritime capabilities in the early twentieth century� 
Germany challenged British maritime security in the early twentieth century� 
Russia frequently sought great-maritime-power capabilities, including in the 
1850s, in the 1890s and the early twenty-first century, and in the late 1970s and 
’80s� Japan simultaneously sought maritime hegemony in the western Pacific 
Ocean and continental hegemony on the East Asian mainland in the 1930s� In 
the twenty-first century, China has launched an extensive buildup of its navy to 
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secure great-power maritime capabilities and to challenge U�S� maritime domi-
nance in East Asia�
Great-power development of destabilizing maritime capabilities frequently 
has reflected the nationalist aspirations for great-power status associated with 
the possession of large capital ships and a reputation for maritime dominance� 
Great-power nationalist aspirations may reflect the personal ambitions of auto-
cratic leaders, the pressures on unstable autocratic regimes to use nationalism to 
enhance domestic legitimacy, the popular aspirations of voters in a democratic 
state for international prestige, or a combination thereof� But whatever its par-
ticular sources, naval nationalism can have the effect of encouraging expansionist 
maritime policies, which can force acquisitions that are not informed by strategic 
interests and that ultimately undermine security and contribute to unnecessary 
and costly great-power conflict, including war�
This article examines three case studies of nationalist-driven great-power 
maritime aspirations from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries� It addresses 
the role of nationalism in driving French maritime ambitions in the 1850s and 
1860s, under the leadership of Louis-Napoléon; German maritime ambitions in 
the early 1900s, under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II; and U�S� maritime 
ambitions in the late 1890s and especially at the beginning of the following 
decade, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt� In each case, the article 
examines the high cost of the revisionist power’s naval expansionism, the relative 
importance of its strategic and economic maritime interests to its naval buildup, 
and the nonmaterial nationalist sources of its expanding maritime ambitions and 
quest for great-power status� It places these countries’ naval nationalism within 
the context of their distinct geopolitical circumstances and the challenges to their 
continental security interests, explaining both the failures of French and German 
naval expansionism and the success of American naval expansionism�
The article’s fourth case study examines China’s recent ambition to acquire 
great-power maritime capabilities� Like the other case studies, this one considers 
the material and nationalist sources of China’s naval ambitions� It also analyzes 
China’s recent naval expansionism in the context of China’s post–Cold War geo-
political circumstances, considers the prospects for China’s success, and explores 
the implications for great-power politics and U�S�-Chinese relations�
NATIONALISM, FRENCH NAVAL AMBITIONS IN THE 1850s AND 
’60s, AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH NAVAL ARMS RACE
In 1858, following the attempted assassination of Louis-Napoléon by Italian 
nationalists based in England and led by Felice Orsini, France began a major 
expansion of its maritime defense budget and its naval shipbuilding program�1 
The catalyst for the French buildup was British naval power and popular French 
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hostility toward the apparent inadequacy of British opposition to anti-French 
terrorists in the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt�
The era began with France’s completion in 1858 of the large, modern port 
facilities at Cherbourg on the English Channel—directly across from English 
shores�2 France also deployed more ships in the English Channel, and with 
construction of the Suez Canal it expanded its presence in the Mediterranean 
Sea, thus posing a growing challenge to British maritime security� France also 
significantly increased its defense spending through the early 1860s to support 
its naval buildup; in six years the French naval budget grew by over 30 percent� 
Louis-Napoléon also increased French naval personnel, so that the number of 
French sailors and marines was nearly twice the British total�3
Along with increased naval spending and naval expansion, France launched a 
new stage of naval competition when it preceded Great Britain in the construc-
tion of the first ironclad capital ship� In 1858, it ordered construction of six iron-
clads; it began constructing the first that year and another in 1859; and it com-
missioned the first, Gloire, in 1860� France thus began a rapid ship-construction 
program, and by the end of the decade it had constructed twenty-six ironclads, 
representing a challenge to Great Britain in the form of potential maritime su-
premacy in British coastal waters�4
As French naval power grew, the regime explicitly challenged British security� 
In 1860, the French ambassador in London warned that if Great Britain did not 
accept French ambitions in Europe, France would destroy the foundations of 
British naval power� Napoléon III publicly aspired to turn the Mediterranean Sea 
into a “French lake�”5
Louis-Napoléon, Nationalism, and French Naval Ambition
France’s ambitious maritime policy was financially costly and strategically risky� 
While the country increased its naval budget, its army budget stagnated and its 
continental defense capability languished� At the outset of the naval buildup, 
France’s naval ambitions also risked heightened conflict with Great Britain� The 
combination of belligerent French diplomacy and the naval buildup created the 
1859–60 French “invasion scare” in England� French naval ambitions alarmed 
Queen Victoria and Prince Consort Albert� Queen Victoria argued that Great 
Britain’s “very existence may be said to depend” on the country’s resolve to main-
tain its maritime supremacy� The prime minister, Henry J� Temple, Lord Palmer-
ston, was especially alarmed by the French buildup and successfully argued for 
funding the rapid fortification of British harbors and dockyards�6
France’s challenge to British maritime supremacy was intrinsically risky, yet 
French naval ambitions were not fueled by either relative expanded financial 
resources or increased security or economic concerns� Trends in relative British 
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and French economic development in the 1850s did not suggest a financial op-
portunity for France to outspend Great Britain in a naval arms race� On the 
contrary, during the 1850s trends in British and French economic growth signifi-
cantly reduced French financial competitive ability vis-à-vis Great Britain, and by 
1860 British gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 40 percent greater 
than French GDP, so Great Britain was in a much better position to fund an arms 
race�7 Moreover, unlike France, because of its territorial security Great Britain 
could prioritize funding for the navy within its overall defense budget�
France’s growing naval budget burden also did not represent a strategic re-
sponse to increased British maritime capabilities� From the end of the Crimean 
War through 1859, London maintained a moderate maritime budget and ship-
building program and the 
strength of its fleet declined, 
even as France modernized 
and expanded the size of its 
fleet� London showed mini-
mal interest in developing 
ironclad ships� Moreover, the 
bulk of British ships remained in distant waters rather than in the vicinity of 
French coastal waters�8 Thus, heightened threat perception did not drive France’s 
revisionist maritime acquisitions�
Similarly, concern for economic security did not drive France’s heightened 
maritime ambitions� Despite France’s colonial presence in northern Africa and 
its recent acquisition of colonies in Indochina, France remained dependent on its 
continental economic relationships� In 1858, approximately two-thirds of French 
total trade was conducted with four of its immediate neighbors: Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain� During the decade prior to the onset of the American Civil 
War in 1860, the United States was France’s leading single trade partner, but the 
U�S� portion of total French trade declined over the course of the 1850s�9 Thus, 
growing global economic interests and the increased importance of protecting 
sea-lanes and overseas trade relationships did not drive France’s heightened inter-
est in maritime power and its challenge to British security�
Thus, in general, material interests cannot explain France’s costly pursuit 
of maritime ambitions and its challenge to British maritime security� Rather, 
France’s naval ambitions reflected a combination of Louis-Napoléon’s personal 
commitment to developing French naval power and his use of French naval 
power to sustain his domestic political legitimacy, and thereby the stability of his 
autocratic regime� The French fleet under Louis-Napoléon was a “prestige fleet�” 
In its support for Louis-Napoléon, the French populace sought glory over all else, 
and the navy was the “principal instrument of glory�”10
Louis-Napoléon’s preoccupation with great-
power status to the detriment of security 
contributed to a devastating French military 
defeat, the demise of his nationalist regime, 
and his exile from France.
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Louis-Napoléon’s overwhelming election as president in 1848 and his continu-
ing popularity reflected his populist legitimacy among the rural masses as the 
French leader� They believed he represented the interests of the people rather 
than the aristocracy and would restore the glory of the French empire� He was 
the “Napoléon of the people�” His antiaristocratic coup d’état in 1851 and the 
restoration of the empire were well received as promasses, populist measures�11 
Nonetheless, potential opposition to his regime was a constant concern, and he 
depended on the army to maintain domestic stability and suppress potential op-
position movements� In this political context, an essential aspect of Napoléon’s 
domestic legitimacy derived from his stature as a military leader� On his election 
to the presidency in 1848, he put on a military uniform and posed as an imperial 
leader, and frequently reviewed the troops with great fanfare� Moreover, popular 
support in the 1850s for military adventurism contributed to France’s military 
policies and its participation in the Crimean War, its war in Italy, and its Mexican 
expedition�12 Napoléon’s “forward foreign policy,” including his support for war 
against Russia, reflected his effort to retain his “precarious hold upon the French 
people�”13
In the aftermath of Louis-Napoléon’s succession of military successes in the 
1850s, French naval nationalism assumed heightened importance as a source of 
the regime’s legitimacy� Moreover, following the Orsini bomb plot, French public 
opinion turned against London� Orsini’s bomb had been made in England, and 
the French public was dissatisfied with British efforts to curtail subsequent anti-
French activities in England�14 In this domestic and international context, despite 
Louis-Napoléon’s commitment to Anglo-French cooperation, his domestic po-
litical interests encouraged him to pursue French international prestige through 
the construction of world-class maritime capabilities�
In addition to his domestic political interest in developing expansive naval 
power, Louis-Napoléon also possessed a strong personal nationalist interest in 
military affairs, and particularly in maritime power and French shipbuilding� 
He played an active role in developing day-to-day French naval policy, and he 
personally decided that France should commence construction of the world’s 
first ironclad ship� Following the French bombardment of Sevastopol during the 
Crimean War in 1854 and the substantial damage that return fire inflicted on 
French wooden ships, Louis-Napoléon proposed the development of ironclads� 
He then actively promoted research into ironclad technologies and ordered and 
oversaw the early experiments of the armor-plated ships, leading to the comple-
tion of Gloire� He also made detailed recommendations for the dimensions of 
particular ships for particular missions� He was thus an active “lobbyist” on 
behalf of the French navy and the “prime catalyst” of French maritime innova-
tion� The ironclads were the “Emperor’s own creation,” and he had “inaugurated 
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a great revolution in naval architecture�”15 His intrinsic fascination with naval 
matters made possible the allocation of scarce financial resources away from 
the French army for the construction and deployment of ironclads, which fed 
France’s ambition to become a major maritime power and challenge British 
maritime security�
Geopolitics and the Failure of French Nationalism
Not only did Louis-Napoléon’s leadership of French populist nationalism and his 
personal naval ambitions fail to promote greater French maritime security and 
French great-power status, but rather they contributed to a major weakening of 
French security� In 1858, in response to France’s completion of its naval base at 
Cherbourg and the continuance of its ambitious shipbuilding program, Great 
Britain fortified its coastal regions and began deployment of a Channel Fleet—an 
unusual policy in peacetime� Thousands of British volunteer riflemen went to the 
shore to defend Great Britain’s coast from the French navy�16
Then, when French construction of the first ironclads threatened to make 
British Royal Navy ships obsolete, Great Britain in 1859 began construction 
of its own ironclads, launching HMS Warrior in December� Between October 
1860 and August 1861, Great Britain increased its planned construction of iron-
clads from four to fifteen ships� In response to France’s numerical superiority 
in ironclads, Britain abandoned its ongoing construction of wooden, screw- 
propulsion liners in favor of an all-ironclad fleet� Moreover, Great Britain’s iron-
clads were superior to France’s ironclads, in that they had iron hulls, in contrast 
to the wooden hulls of the French ironclads� In addition, British ironclads were 
over 50 percent larger than French ironclads� Trends in numerical superiority 
also favored Great Britain�17
By the early 1860s, England’s superior financial resources and industrial 
strength had dashed any French hope that France might take a permanent lead 
over Great Britain in warship construction� By the mid-1860s, France had no 
choice but to acquiesce to enduring British maritime superiority, and both sides 
returned to their pre–arms race levels of defense spending, in keeping with a 
status quo ante maritime balance of power�18
But the greatest impact of Louis-Napoléon’s personal preoccupation with 
maritime affairs and France’s popular nationalist naval aspirations was the ef-
fect on French continental security� Despite Louis-Napoléon’s dependence on 
the army for his political base, domestic prestige, and maintenance of domestic 
stability, the army was the weakest of the French armed services� The service was 
poorly administered and Napoléon neglected to use his authority to modernize 
the ground forces and impose needed reforms on recruitment and training�19 
Thus, in the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War, the French army performed poorly, 
failing to provide even modest resistance to the Prussian invasion�
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Meanwhile, during the war the navy was mostly irrelevant, as the decisive bat-
tles were fought on land, not at sea� But equally revealing was the French navy’s 
poor wartime performance, despite its numerical superiority over the Prussian 
navy� By the time the navy mobilized for war, the decisive land battles were over 
and the outcome of the war had been decided� Napoléon’s focus on the develop-
ment of a large maritime fleet to enhance French great-power prestige did not 
include development of the intelligence and training required to deploy the fleet 
quickly and effectively�20
French resources and Louis-Napoléon’s military interests would have served 
France better if they had focused on continental security rather than French 
maritime grandeur, and if France had maintained a low-cost yet effective guerre 
de course capability that could protect French trading interests� France pursued 
this strategy in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War when it developed 
its “asymmetric” Jeune École maritime policy�21 Ultimately, however, Louis-
Napoléon’s preoccupation with great-power status to the detriment of security 
contributed to a devastating French military defeat, the demise of his nationalist 
regime, and his exile from France�
NATIONALISM, GERMAN NAVAL AMBITIONS, AND THE  
PRE–WORLD WAR I ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL ARMS RACE
Beginning in 1898, Germany launched a major naval shipbuilding effort that 
imposed a significant financial burden on the country’s finances and provoked 
a dangerous arms race with Great Britain� In 1898, Germany’s First Naval Law 
funded the construction over six years of nineteen battleships and an additional 
fifty ships� Two years later, the Second Naval Law nearly doubled the scope of 
this plan, providing unlimited funding for construction of thirty-eight battle-
ships and a total of ninety-six ships� Between 1900 and 1905, Germany laid down 
twelve battleships�
When Great Britain responded to Germany’s naval buildup with the construc-
tion of the first Dreadnought-class battleship in 1905, thus neutralizing Germa-
ny’s superior matériel, Germany countered with its own dreadnought program, 
determined to outrace Britain and challenge its maritime dominance� The 1906 
German Novelle (supplemental bill) allocated funding for two dreadnoughts and 
increased naval spending by 35 percent�
But British efforts to sustain the naval arms race led to ever-further expan-
sion of Germany’s shipbuilding plans and to greater German naval expenditures� 
Between 1905 and 1914, the German naval budget increased by 102 percent and 
absorbed an ever-larger share of the total defense budget� Between 1901 and 
1909, the German naval budget nearly equaled the entire German budget deficit, 
and it continued to grow�22
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Kaiser Wilhelm, Nationalism, and German Naval Ambition
Germany’s naval ambitions were strategically risky� They provoked a naval arms 
race with Britain and risked a British preventive attack on the nascent German 
fleet, a “Copenhagen�” British leaders, including Admiral of the Fleet Sir John A� 
Fisher and Civil Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee, advocated such an attack, and 
German leaders, including State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office Admiral 
Alfred von Tirpitz, were acutely aware of the risk of a British preventive attack 
before Germany could achieve a deterrent capability, during the “danger zone” 
of its naval buildup�23 Equally important, Germany’s naval ambitions threatened 
the German ground force’s capability and German continental security� As ten-
sion mounted on the continent and the likelihood of war increased, budget 
competition from the navy increasingly constrained the German army’s access 
to resources� From 1904 to 1912, while the naval budget climbed 137 percent, the 
army budget grew 47 percent� Despite Germany’s precarious two-front territorial 
defense dilemma, from 1889 to 1911 the relative size of the naval budget grew 
from 20 percent to nearly 55 percent of the army budget, so Germany essentially 
was allocating equal financing to the navy and each of the land fronts�24
Neither expanded relative financial resources nor increased security or eco-
nomic interests can explain Germany’s ambitious and risky naval ambitions� Un-
like France in the 1850s and ’60s, Germany experienced considerable industrial 
development in the 1880s and ’90s� From 1880 to 1900, the German GDP grew a 
remarkable 44 percent; during this same period, the British GDP grew less than 
30 percent� But because of Great Britain’s prior significant economic lead over 
Germany, Germany’s more rapid economic development did not enable it to 
diminish significantly Britain’s financial advantage; in 1900, the British economy 
remained nearly one-third larger than the German economy� Overall, British 
global industrial domination diminished in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, but Germany’s industrial development had not yet yielded it the finan-
cial parity with Great Britain that could foster the confidence necessary to chal-
lenge British maritime dominance� On the contrary, rather than benefiting from 
German economic growth, Germany’s increased naval budget was a major source 
of Germany’s budget deficit�25 Moreover, Germany should have been cautioned 
further by the British ability to prioritize its naval budget over its army budget, 
unlike Germany�
Germany’s ready dismissal of its economic constraints did not reflect a height-
ened British maritime threat to German security� During the 1880s and early ’90s, 
the British navy became increasingly overextended as its colonial commitments 
came under challenge, not only in distant waters of the Western Hemisphere and 
East Asia, but also in European waters, with the rise of the French and Russian 
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navies and the prospect of Franco-Russian cooperation� The latter development 
challenged British maritime security in the Mediterranean Sea and compelled 
Great Britain to budget so as to maintain its two-power standard� Moreover, 
worldwide interest in maritime power had stimulated ship production among all 
the great powers� Whereas in 1893 British battleships nearly equaled in number 
the combined total of all the other great powers’ battleships, in 1897 its advantage 
had disappeared; it now possessed approximately two-thirds of the total of the 
other great powers’ battleships� In this transformed strategic environment, Great 
Britain reduced its strategic 
commitments in the Carib-
bean Sea and in Northeast 
Asia and redeployed much 
of its fleet to the Mediter-
ranean�26 Thus, in the 1890s, 
British maritime capabilities 
and deployments did not pose 
a growing threat to German maritime security that might explain Germany’s 
insistence on incurring the financial and strategic burdens of unrestrained naval 
expansion and an Anglo-German arms race�
Germany’s global colonial and economic interests expanded in the 1890s and 
the early twentieth century, but they were not a compelling driver of naval expan-
sion either� Granted, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s interest in colonial expan-
sion and Germany’s acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific Ocean in the 1880s and 
’90s created a German motivation to protect its colonial possessions and its trade 
with its new colonies; moreover, from 1899 to 1910, as Germany required ever-
greater exports to support its growing industrial sector, total German foreign 
trade increased by nearly 80 percent, creating in parallel a greater German inter-
est in maritime security�27 Nonetheless, German colonies made only a secondary 
contribution to German economic prosperity� As late as 1895, over 60 percent 
of Germany’s trade was with its European neighbors� The overwhelming share 
of Germany’s remaining trade, and its most important overseas trade, was con-
ducted with the United States� German trade with its colonies was insignificant�28 
Thus, for Germany, economic security priorities lay in continental security�
Thus, in the mid-1890s Chancellor Leo von Caprivi argued that Germany 
should not seek maritime security through development of a major oceangoing 
fleet� In particular, he argued that Germany lacked the maritime potential to 
guarantee its transatlantic trade with the United States� Because Germany’s con-
tinental neighbors were its most important trading partners and its colonies were 
inconsequential to German economic security, Caprivi believed that Germany 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s pursuit of his personal naval 
ambitions and his political manipulation of 
popular German naval nationalism not only 
failed to promote German maritime security 
. . . but contributed to a major weakening of 
German continental security.
Autumn2018Review.indb   19 8/6/18   8:49 AM
9
Ross: Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the Ninetee
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 2 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
should concentrate its defense resources on its ground forces to enable it to domi-
nate the continent, and that it should develop only a limited counterblockade 
capability to ensure continued access to overseas trade�29 But Caprivi’s prudent 
foreign policy preferences failed to gain the kaiser’s support, and advocates of 
naval expansion soon dominated the development of German maritime policy�
As in the discussion of the sources of French maritime policy from 1858 
through the 1860s under Louis-Napoléon, German material interests cannot ex-
plain Germany’s costly maritime ambitions in the 1890s and early twentieth cen-
tury and its challenge to British maritime security� Rather, similarly to France’s 
ambitions under Louis-Napoléon, Germany’s revisionist naval ambitions and 
its maritime policies reflected the destructive combination of Kaiser Wilhelm’s 
personal nationalist commitment to developing a global naval capability that 
would challenge British maritime dominance and the growing dependence of the 
regime on nationalism for domestic legitimacy�
Kaiser Wilhelm’s commitment to building a world-class German navy, regard-
less of the strategic and financial impediments, reflected his personal obsession 
with naval power and his association of naval power with great-power status and 
Germany’s destiny� He considered the head of state to be the “officer of the watch 
of the ship of state” and identified his historic mission as the development of a 
German navy with stature and capabilities similar to those of the German army� 
He personally telegraphed shipbuilding orders to the naval yards� He bestowed on 
himself the title of grand admiral of the Imperial German Navy, and he enjoyed 
his status as admiral of the Russian navy; admiral of the royal navies of Great Brit-
ain, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; and honorary admiral of the Greek navy� He 
possessed a personal flotilla of naval ships that he used for his summer voyages� 
From the earliest days of his regime he wore his naval uniform and saw to it that 
he was the only member of the German aristocracy to wear an executive naval 
officer’s uniform� He also dressed his sons in naval uniforms� As Admiral Tirpitz 
later reported, Wilhelm regarded the German navy as his “mechanical toy�”30
Wilhelm associated his personal attachment to naval power with the neces-
sary emergence of Germany as the preeminent world power� When he spoke of 
Germany achieving its “place in the sun” he meant that Germany must possess 
the world’s most powerful navy� In August 1911, when Germany’s arms race with 
Great Britain was at its height, he declared that Germany must strengthen its 
navy “so that we can be sure that nobody will dispute with us our place in the sun 
which belongs to us!” He insisted that in distant oceans of the globe “no impor-
tant decision should be taken without Germany and the German Kaiser�” He be-
lieved that “without being a world power one was nothing but a poor appearance�” 
When he encountered among his advisers opposition to his plans to increase the 
naval budget, he exclaimed, “I will not allow England to tell me what to do�”31
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But Germany’s revisionist naval ambitions, its challenge to British maritime 
security, and its initiation of the arms race reflected more than Kaiser Wilhelm’s 
personal preoccupation with maritime power and his commitment to German 
great-power status and nationalist aspirations� Germany under Wilhelm was 
experiencing intensifying societal pressures for political reform of its autocratic 
monarchy� In these circumstances, rather than yield to popular demands for 
liberalization, Wilhelm and his conservative advisers developed domestic and 
foreign policies that would unify the German people behind Wilhelm and his 
autocratic leadership and consolidate his monarchy�32 For the German autocracy, 
the navy was the most powerful source of German nationalist unity, so appeals 
to German naval power served the interests of the German regime as well as 
Wilhelm’s personal ambitions, just as naval expansionism had served Louis-
Napoléon’s interest in bolstering regime legitimacy�
In the aftermath of German unification, many of Germany’s institutions, 
including the army, railways, and postal service, were not national institutions 
but institutions of the German component states� Because a German navy did 
not exist prior to unification in 1871, it was created by the new German imperial 
government under the direct authority of the kaiser� It was the foremost German 
“national institution�” In addition, the navy embodied German middle-class con-
cepts of German culture and international economic superiority� And unlike the 
German army, the German navy was not the exclusive realm of the aristocracy; 
members of the German bourgeoisie could enlist in the navy and rise through 
the ranks to become senior officers� This created widespread popular support for 
the German navy�33
Within German society, the Navy League occupied a prominent place� It was 
the most popular of all Germany’s various nationalist groups, including the Pan-
German League and the Colonial Society, and it established branches throughout 
the country� Despite its later start, in 1898, within its first eighteen months, the 
Navy League surpassed in total membership all the other nationalist groups com-
bined� The 1900 Second Naval Law stimulated a major increase in Navy League 
membership, and by 1907 it had over a million members and associates, making 
its membership over eight times larger than that of the Colonial Society�34
Thus, on the one hand, for German naval leaders seeking support for naval 
spending, appeals to popular nationalism were effective� Wilhelm understood 
this and planned budget politics accordingly, to realize his personal nationalist 
ambitions�35 On the other hand, for the German elite seeking to promote its na-
tionalist credentials and foster national unity under the monarchy, the navy was 
the perfect nationalist instrument� Thus, as in France under Louis-Napoléon, a 
mutually reinforcing relationship existed between Kaiser Wilhelm’s use of popu-
lar naval nationalism to serve his personal ambition for Germany’s naval buildup 
Autumn2018Review.indb   21 8/6/18   8:49 AM
11
Ross: Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the Ninetee
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 2 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
and its great-power status and the monarchy’s use of naval expansionism to en-
hance popular support for the regime. Admiral Tirpitz well understood this dual 
value of naval nationalism.36
Geopolitics and the Failure of German Nationalism
Kaiser Wilhelm’s pursuit of his personal naval ambitions and his political ma-
nipulation of popular German naval nationalism not only failed to promote Ger-
man maritime security and Germany’s “place in the sun” as a maritime power but 
contributed to a major weakening of German continental security.37 Despite Ger-
many’s extensive effort to compete with British naval power, throughout World 
War I the German fleet of dreadnoughts was unable to challenge British maritime 
supremacy. In the decade prior to World War I, whereas Berlin allocated between 
19 and 26 percent of its defense budget to the navy, London allocated 60 percent 
of its defense budget to the navy. Ultimately, Wilhelm and Tirpitz had to give up 
the naval race to focus Germany’s limited resources on its army and continental 
security.38
Great Britain’s victory in the naval race enabled it to impose a close-in blockade 
of German maritime trade for the duration of the war. The German fleet ventured 
into the North Sea to engage the British fleet just once during the war. Although 
Germany fared better than Britain in the 1916 battle of Jutland and could claim 
a tactical victory, its greater losses relative to the sizes of the respective fleets de-
terred Germany from seeking a second engagement. Its fleet remained in harbor 
for the remainder of the war, essentially irrelevant to its outcome.39
But the greatest impact of Germany’s nationalist naval ambition was its diver-
sion of scarce economic resources from more strategically important priorities, 
and thus its contribution to German military defeat in World War I. In the mari-
time theater, Wilhelm’s preoccupation with battleships led him to neglect Ger-
man development of a cost-effective counterblockade submarine fleet that could 
have posed a more secure and effective threat against the British fleet.40
In contrast, Adolf Hitler later would understand the value of a less expensive 
submarine capability to a continental power’s blockade and counterblockade 
capabilities. In September 1939, after the early successes of his U-boats against 
British shipping, Hitler switched to construction of a massive U-boat fleet. His 
guerre de course strategy drastically reduced British imports, while posing a mini-
mal constraint on Germany’s continental capabilities.41
In the continental theater of World War I, the effect of Wilhelm’s failure to 
place sufficient priority on German ground forces was all too clear on the western 
front. Diversion of funds equivalent to the cost of even one dreadnought to create 
an additional German division might well have enabled an early German victory 
against France and altered the campaign on the eastern front against Russia.
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Ultimately, Kaiser Wilhelm’s intense military interests would have served 
Germany better if he had focused on developing a more robust continental secu-
rity force so as to dominate continental Europe, while procuring only a limited 
maritime capability, rather than on securing Germany’s “place in the sun” as a 
global maritime great power. Wilhelm’s nationalist preoccupation with German 
naval preeminence on the high seas contributed to a devastating German military 
defeat in World War I and the demise of his monarchy.
NATIONALISM, AMERICAN NAVAL AMBITIONS, AND AMERICA’S 
RISE TO WORLD POWER
As was true of the sources of France’s and Germany’s expansive naval ambitions, 
the development of expansive U.S. naval ambitions during Theodore Roosevelt’s 
presidency in the first decade of the twentieth century did not reflect pressing 
security or international economic concerns. Rather, similarly to the French and 
German experiences, the U.S. maritime buildup reflected a combination of a 
personal nationalist leadership commitment to developing great-power maritime 
capabilities and the domestic politics of mass nationalism.
From the end of the Civil War until the passage in 1890 of the so-called Battle-
ship Act, the United States neglected its navy; minimal funding and poor condi-
tions allowed the deterioration of the country’s naval capabilities. The 1890 act 
funded construction of three second-class battleships to provide a coastal, guerre 
de course naval capability. Then in 1895 Congress authorized funding for the con-
struction of the first two first-class American battleships and the development of 
an oceangoing power-projection capability. In the ten years between 1900 and 
1910, the U.S. Navy commissioned twenty-five first-class battleships, including 
world-class dreadnought-type battleships, as well as many smaller ships. During 
the Roosevelt presidency, the Navy commissioned twenty-one battleships. After 
fifteen years of funding, in 1910 the U.S. Navy possessed the second-largest num-
ber of capital ships in the world.42
This naval buildup was the result of a fundamental reorientation of U.S. 
military priorities. The 1890 naval act doubled in one year U.S. spending on the 
Navy. During the Roosevelt presidency, the naval budget increased from fifty-five 
million dollars to $140 million, a peacetime record for U.S. naval appropriations, 
and the tonnage of U.S. capital ships doubled. The Roosevelt administration also 
tripled the number of active-duty naval personnel. During this same period, 
the U.S. Army budget stagnated and the number of army personnel decreased 
by 20 percent. Whereas in 1900 the number of naval personnel was less than 20 
percent that of army personnel, in 1910 that proportion was nearly 60 percent. 
Increased naval spending during the Roosevelt presidency also changed federal 
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budget priorities� Between 1900 and 1910, the defense budget share of the overall 
federal budget increased from 36�6 percent to 45�1 percent�43 Under Roosevelt’s 
leadership, the United States began its transition from being a land power to a 
naval power�
Theodore Roosevelt, Nationalism, and American Naval Ambition
Neither increased U�S� security concerns nor greater U�S� international economic 
interests can explain the costly transformation in U�S� defense policy� In inter-
national security affairs, the rapid buildup of U�S� naval forces coincided with 
the most secure era in U�S� history� Whereas since 1776 the United States had 
been plagued with concerns about European military presence in the Western 
Hemisphere and the implications for U�S� territorial security, by the time of the 
Roosevelt administration all the European powers had retreated from the West-
ern Hemisphere, withdrawing their naval presences to home waters to deal with 
pressing European security concerns� The turning point in U�S� domination of 
the western Atlantic was the outcome of the 1895 Anglo-Venezuelan boundary 
dispute� Amid a context of German involvement in the Boer conflict in South 
Africa, Russian challenges to the British presence in South Asia, and the rise of 
the French and Russian navies, the growing threat of war with the United States 
compelled Great Britain to concede the merits of the Monroe Doctrine and to 
acknowledge the U�S� right to intervene in disputes between Latin American and 
European countries� By 1902, Great Britain began a strategic withdrawal from the 
Western Hemisphere, conceding U�S� maritime superiority, and it soon welcomed 
American expansion, both in its colonial presence in the western Pacific and in 
the form of the construction of the Panama Canal�44
Germany posed an equally remote threat to U�S� security� It had no naval 
bases in the Western Hemisphere and faced multiple strategic challenges in 
continental Europe and a costly maritime competition with Great Britain� By 
the beginning of the Roosevelt administration, the combination of military and 
political conditions had eliminated a German challenge to U�S� preeminence in 
the Western Hemisphere� Both Kaiser Wilhelm and Chancellor Bernhard von 
Bülow understood the importance of not antagonizing the United States�45 Thus, 
during the 1901 German-Venezuelan dispute, Germany imposed a blockade on 
Venezuela but shortly thereafter accepted U�S� mediation of the dispute, thus 
concurring with Britain’s earlier acknowledgment of a U�S� right to intervene in 
Latin America� The end of the German blockade signaled the demise of German 
ambitions in Latin America�46
Nor could Japan threaten the United States� In 1890, the Japanese navy was 
weaker than the U�S� Navy, and the Pacific Ocean was a formidable barrier to 
Japanese power projection into the Western Hemisphere�47
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Thus, in 1890 the Naval Board recognized that the United States did not face a 
threat from any advanced power, including Great Britain� By the early twentieth 
century, the United States enjoyed “remarkable security,” and Theodore Roosevelt 
understood this� He believed that Great Britain dared not provoke war with the 
United States and that it had conceded leadership to the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere�48 Any alleged threat from Germany was premised on that 
country’s reputed long-term intentions, rather than on its immediate capabilities, 
and Roosevelt understood the limits to the German challenge� Given current 
trends in European great-power politics, a potential German naval threat did 
not require a rapid and expensive buildup of the U�S� Navy� After the U�S� naval 
buildup was well under way in 1906, Roosevelt raised the Japanese navy as a po-
tential threat to U�S� security, but he also understood that if this threat developed 
it would do so in the distant future� Throughout the Roosevelt presidency, the 
absence of a threat to U�S� security frustrated the Navy’s effort to articulate a naval 
policy and to justify a naval buildup�49
The United States also did not require a strong oceangoing navy to protect 
its interests in foreign trade and international investments� In 1900, less than 
10 percent of U�S� GDP came from foreign trade; exports constituted less than 5 
percent of GDP�50 During the rise of U�S� naval power, the United States was not 
a trading nation� Moreover, during this period the United States possessed only a 
small commercial fleet; most U�S� trade was carried on foreign-flagged ships� The 
United States gained colonial interests in the western Pacific Ocean following the 
war of 1898, but the economic significance of the Philippines, of other U�S� Pacific 
possessions, and of overall U�S� trade with East Asia did not require development 
of a large navy to protect U�S� economic interests in the western Pacific� President 
Roosevelt understood this and did not attempt to justify U�S� maritime expansion 
on the basis of American economic interests�51
Similarly to the sources of French maritime policy from 1858 through the 
1860s under Louis-Napoléon and of German maritime policy prior to World 
War I, national material interests cannot explain expansive U�S� maritime ambi-
tions in the early twentieth century� Rather, American revisionist naval ambitions 
reflected dynamics similar to those that gave rise to French and German naval 
ambitions� U�S� naval policies reflected President Roosevelt’s personal interest in 
naval ships and his nationalist commitment to maritime power, combined with 
the impact of American popular nationalism on the development of U�S� defense 
policy�
According to Howard K� Beale, Theodore Roosevelt shared with Kaiser 
Wilhelm a “boyish” fascination with naval ships� As a young boy, Roosevelt 
greatly admired his two uncles who had served in the Confederate navy and he 
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maintained a long-term relationship with them� In his senior year at Harvard he 
began writing a scholarly volume on the naval history of the War of 1812� In his 
introduction to the volume, Roosevelt expressed his personal outrage at the poor 
condition of the U�S� Navy during the war and the importance of naval power 
for national dignity� He wrote that it was “folly” for “the great English-speaking 
Republic to possess such an old and inadequate fleet”; America deserved better� 
Equally important for explaining his lifelong commitment to U�S� naval power 
was the intrinsic excitement Roosevelt associated, from boyhood forward, with 
naval warfare, along with the youthful pleasure, natural fun, and lifelong exhila-
ration he derived from having 
and directing a large navy�52
Roosevelt’s early interest 
in and enthusiasm for naval 
matters contributed to his 
strong personal attention 
to naval policy during his 
presidency� Throughout his 
presidency he possessed a 
nearly “fanatical desire” and persistent determination to develop a large navy� 
In contrast to his predecessors, he personally participated with Congress in de-
veloping naval appropriations legislation, and he used his considerable political 
popularity and political drive to compel congressional support for his policies� 
In his first message to Congress, in December 1901—within three months of his 
inauguration—Roosevelt made a rousing appeal for a large navy, and soon there-
after he presented specific funding legislation� Throughout his presidency he was 
personally involved in such detailed issues as the height of smokestacks and the 
proper deployment of ships in battle groups�53
Roosevelt combined his personal interest in ships and navies with a nationalist 
impulse to promote American great-power status in world affairs� In this respect, 
the rise of the United States as a global naval power depended on the leader’s na-
tionalist impulse, similarly to the dependence on the leaders’ nationalist impulses 
of the development of the French navy under Louis-Napoléon and the German 
navy under Kaiser Wilhelm�
Roosevelt and his associates, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry 
Cabot Lodge, were strong nationalists who were impelled by an overwhelming 
pride in the United States� Roosevelt believed that American honor should be 
placed above the honor of all other nations� Thus, he considered it “imperti-
nence” for any country to be angry at U�S� actions, was intent on defending U�S� 
honor and establishing U�S� resolve, and was determined to resist challenges to 
U�S� achievement and maintenance of world-power status� Thus he argued that 
America pursued its naval ambitions wearing 
the same strategic blinders as had France and 
Germany. The United States succeeded where 
other great powers had failed because of the 
fortuitous combination of domestic circum-
stances with a strategic opportunity in great-
power politics.
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the United States required warships in numbers commensurate with “the great-
ness of our people” and that a large navy would serve U�S� prestige� When Britain 
launched its first dreadnought, Roosevelt was determined that the United States 
should possess the world’s largest battleships� He pushed through Congress fund-
ing for construction of U�S� dreadnoughts that were larger than those of both 
Britain and Germany�54
Roosevelt’s nationalism, including his sense of American greatness, superior-
ity, and infallibility and his inability to conceive of any reason for another nation 
to oppose U�S� diplomacy and military policies, was rooted in his conviction of 
the superiority of the Anglo-American race and its destiny to lead the world� The 
United States stood for peace and civilization, and U�S� expansionism and impe-
rialism, including the development of U�S� maritime power, reflected a national 
obligation to crusade for international moral improvement and the spread of 
civilization to “backward” peoples� In 1893, Roosevelt wrote that it would be “a 
crime against white civilization” for the United States not to annex Hawaii� The 
U�S� victory in the war against Spain and its territorial acquisitions in the Far East 
should make Americans proud that the United States now could take its place 
among the world’s great powers�55
Roosevelt’s nationalist aspirations for U�S� honor and international prestige 
were important for the rise of the U�S� Navy� But equally important was the popu-
lar American nationalism that reinforced Roosevelt’s personal aspirations and 
established the national democratic political conditions for U�S� naval expansion-
ism� In the context of a significant economic recession in the 1890s and the final 
fulfillment of Manifest Destiny from coast to coast and the end of the American 
“frontier,” Americans were susceptible to emotional sources of renewed national 
pride, including the superiority of American values and the legitimacy of U�S� 
global power� American churches joined in the expansionist movement, promot-
ing the “imperialism of righteousness” that would spread to the world American 
religious values, thus complementing Roosevelt’s personal “crusade” to spread 
Anglo-American civilization�56
These popular societal trends established the underlying foundation for jingo-
ism, America’s particular style of nationalism, and for its effect on both U�S� do-
mestic politics and foreign policy� In this context, forceful U�S� resistance in 1895 
to British policy toward Venezuela and Great Britain’s subsequent acceptance of 
U�S� intervention in Latin America reflected widespread American nationalism 
and support for an expansionist foreign policy and the corresponding political 
pressures on U�S� foreign policy making� The outcome of the 1895 Venezuela 
crisis also encouraged Americans to press for further military-backed nationalist 
successes� These trends continued through the end of the decade, when popular 
nationalism was a powerful force leading in 1898 to the annexation of Hawaii 
Autumn2018Review.indb   27 8/6/18   8:49 AM
17
Ross: Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the Ninetee
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 2 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
and the U�S� war against Spain� President William McKinley’s effort to negotiate 
with Spain a resolution to the conflict in Cuba increasingly isolated him from 
Congress and the American people� Quite apart from peripheral U�S� material 
interests in opposing Spain’s Cuba policy, Congress and the voters clamored for 
war, and ultimately they pushed the president into a war he did not support�57
The rapid American naval victory over Spain elicited widespread and enthu-
siastic nationalist pride in the U�S� Navy, and within a year of the war Congress 
passed widely popular legislation that funded construction of five battleships 
and multiple other ships� The Roosevelt administration’s naval legislative agenda 
benefited from the larger American naval nationalism� The Navy League of the 
United States was founded in 1902, its membership grew quickly among retired 
naval officers and American corporate leaders, and it played a valuable role in 
mobilizing support to bring about Roosevelt’s legislative successes�58 Roosevelt 
himself frequently campaigned for his naval legislation with populist speeches 
laden with nationalist appeals harking to the importance of naval expansion 
for America’s world stature� In his first State of the Union address, in December 
1901, he declared that for the “honor” of the United States, the “work of upbuild-
ing the navy must be steadily continued” and that Americans “must either build 
and maintain an adequate navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a 
secondary position in international affairs�”59 During the 1904 presidential cam-
paign, Roosevelt appealed to popular economic nationalism and benefits for the 
American worker to justify his naval policies and U�S� imperialism in East Asia� 
As he later acknowledged, his decision in 1907 to send the U�S� Atlantic fleet on 
an around-the-world cruise reflected more his ultimately successful effort to 
arouse popular nationalist support against congressional opposition to his battle-
ship legislation than his effort to establish global—especially Japanese—respect 
for U�S� power�60
Geopolitics and the Rise of the American Navy
It is tempting to explain America’s unique success by the superiority of U�S� 
political institutions, or the leadership thereof, or both� Neither factor, however, 
can explain American success� American democracy and foreign policy in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century experienced popular jingo-
istic and expansionist impulses that reflected minimal awareness of the relative 
resources or national interests of the United States� Similarly, there is minimal 
documentation that suggests that Theodore Roosevelt calculated that European 
great-power politics or advantageous U�S� economic resources had created a stra-
tegic opportunity for the United States to challenge the regional and global stra-
tegic orders and develop great-power maritime capabilities� America pursued its 
naval ambitions wearing the same strategic blinders as had France and Germany�
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The United States succeeded where other great powers had failed because 
of the fortuitous combination of domestic circumstances with a strategic op-
portunity in great-power politics� American popular naval nationalism and 
the expansionist impulse emerged after the United States had defeated Mexico, 
completed its conquest of the American Indian, and settled the Pacific frontier� 
These developments and the intrinsic stability of the U�S�-Canadian border es-
tablished the enduring territorial security that enabled the United States to fund 
safely its strategic transition from being a continental power dependent on its 
ground forces for security to being a maritime power seeking global influence� 
In contrast, similar efforts by France and Germany jeopardized their territorial 
security and contributed to devastating military defeats�
Moreover, Britain’s preoccupation first with the emerging French and Russian 
navies and then with German naval ambitions compelled it to acquiesce to U�S� 
global naval ambitions and to acknowledge the Caribbean Sea as a U�S� sphere of 
influence�61 These developments in British security enabled the United States to 
avoid engagement in a costly arms race and the prospect of a “Copenhagen”—the 
strategic challenges that plagued the security and naval aspirations of both France 
and Germany�
CHINA GOES TO SEA
A combination of nationalist leadership and popular nationalism drove French 
naval ambitions under Louis-Napoléon in the 1850s and 1860s, German naval 
ambitions under Kaiser Wilhelm in the early twentieth century, and U�S� naval 
ambitions during the Theodore Roosevelt presidency in the early twentieth cen-
tury� In each case, a personal leadership commitment to building naval power 
coalesced with popular nationalism to fuel national ambitions for great-power 
status, reflected in large capital ships and substantial maritime power� Such na-
tionalism contributed to strategic disaster for France and Germany� For the 
United States, however, these same conditions propelled the country to construct, 
by 1908, the world’s second-largest navy while strengthening national security, 
and to establish the foundations for America’s eventual emergence as the world’s 
preeminent maritime power�
In the twenty-first century, China has become the latest land power to go to 
sea� After thirty-five years of double-digit annual growth in its GDP and defense 
spending and significant technological modernization, China is building a 
large and modern naval fleet whose capabilities soon may rival those of the U�S� 
Navy in East Asia� The recent pace of China’s shipbuilding program has been 
impressive� Since 2000, China has replaced most of its prereform platforms with 
“modern” platforms� Whereas only 3 percent of Chinese attack submarines were 
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“modern” in 1996, currently 70 percent are� China also has been developing large 
numbers of modern surface ships� Serial production of the Houbei and Jingdao 
classes has contributed to establishing and maintaining the Chinese maritime 
presence throughout the East and South China Seas� China’s development of a 
next-generation frigate, the Jiangkai class, will enhance the war-fighting capabil-
ity of the Chinese navy� Even at reduced rates of GDP growth, China’s shipbuild-
ing program will add significant numbers of modern naval platforms, including 
attack submarines, frigates, destroyers, and smaller fast-attack ships armed with 
antiship cruise missiles� According to one estimate, assuming that China’s naval 
budget over the next fifteen years grows commensurately with its GDP growth, 
by then the Chinese navy will possess well over four hundred surface combat 
ships and nearly one hundred submarines� All these modern ships will make sig-
nificant contributions to Chinese naval capabilities in the East and South China 
Seas and will contribute to improved Chinese capabilities in the western Pacific 
Ocean�62 China’s navy is not as technologically advanced as the U�S� Navy, but 
even merely in quantity China’s naval ships constitute an effective war-fighting 
force and attest to China’s long-term naval ambitions� The U�S� Navy’s increased 
attention to “dispersed lethality” reflects its concern with the modernization, 
growing number, and improved quality of China’s naval ships�63
China also is developing airpower to support its oceangoing navy� It is produc-
ing military aircraft with greater capabilities and ranges that will provide greater 
air support for Chinese surface ships� Its intermediate-range surface-to-surface 
ballistic missiles can degrade U�S� access to the naval facilities throughout East 
Asia that enable the U�S� Navy to project naval and air power� China also is mod-
ernizing its command and control capabilities with improved satellite communi-
cations and air-based and underwater reconnaissance and targeting�64
Xi Jinping, Nationalism, and Chinese Naval Ambition
As was the case with French, German, and American naval expansionism, 
nationalism is a driver of China’s naval ambitions� Xi Jinping’s “China dream” 
platform is a nationalist promise to bring modernization and advancement not 
only to the Chinese people but also to the Chinese nation in world affairs�65 
Members of the Chinese military, including Chinese naval officers, have argued 
that a “strong army dream” and a strong navy are central to achieving the “China 
dream�”66 Similarly, Xi’s call for da fuxing Zhongguo (the great rejuvenation of 
China) is a direct call for China to restore its status as a great power� In 2017, Xi 
assured the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that “[t]oday, we are closer to the 
goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation than any other time in his-
tory, and we need to build a strong people’s military now more than any other 
time in history�” He promised the PLA that “[w]e will never allow any people, 
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organization, or political party to split any part of Chinese territory from the 
country at any time, in any form�”67
Reinforcing Xi Jinping’s ambitions has been the growth of Chinese mass na-
tionalism� The combination of the spread of the Chinese people’s access to the 
World Wide Web in China’s major cities and widespread dissatisfaction with the 
alleged weakness of Chinese foreign policy, encouraged by the global financial 
crisis and the onset of the U�S� recession, has heightened mass nationalist de-
mands for a more belligerent Chinese foreign policy� Despite China’s authori-
tarian single-party political system, nationalism can influence Chinese foreign 
policy� Leaders who are not sufficiently nationalist/hard-line and responsive to 
mass nationalism can be vulnerable to political challenges from their political 
adversaries—and in China the cost of political defeat is, at best, lifetime isolation 
under house arrest� Equally important, the Chinese Communist Party leadership 
is acutely sensitive to the challenge that social instability, including urban nation-
alist demonstrations, can pose to regime stability and survival�68
In 2009, the number of Internet users in China increased by nearly 60 per-
cent�69 Use of the Internet spread most significantly among the urban population� 
Between 2007 and 2010, Internet usage in Beijing increased by 60 percent, pen-
etrating nearly 70 percent of the population; the comparable figures for Shanghai 
were 67 percent and 65 percent�70 The expansion of Internet usage has led to stri-
dent online nationalist criticism of Chinese foreign policy and has contributed 
to widespread nationalist demonstrations against Japan for its arrest of a Chinese 
fisherman in 2010 and its government’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands in 2012� Belligerent online mass nationalism also contributed to Chinese 
government opposition to U�S� naval exercises in the Yellow Sea following North 
Korea’s 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette�71
As Xi Jinping has promoted a nationalist vision of China’s future and as mass 
nationalism has spread through Chinese cities, he has led China’s naval activism� 
The impact of nationalism and the China dream is especially clear in China’s 
costly commitment to developing aircraft carriers, just as nationalism drove 
French, German, and U�S� acquisition of large capital ships� Given the proximity 
of China’s air and naval bases to its neighbor’s defense facilities in the surround-
ing seas, including those in Japan, Taiwan, and the South China Sea countries, 
China does not require aircraft carriers to project power to contend with regional 
competitors, including the United States, to defend its maritime security�
China’s economic growth increasingly relies on its domestic market� Since 
2006, as Chinese domestic manufacturing has increased, there has been a steady 
and significant decline in Chinese trade dependence, including export depen-
dence�72 China also is only minimally dependent on imports of energy resources 
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for its energy security; approximately 90 percent of Chinese energy resources 
are sourced domestically or via pipelines transiting countries on China’s interior 
periphery� So the country does not require a power-projection navy to defend its 
economic interests�73
But aircraft carriers are a symbol of great-power status, so realization of the 
China dream required China to develop a fleet of them�74 As Chinese leaders 
considered launching China’s first carrier late in the first decade of the twenty-
first century, popular demand for a carrier increased� At public presentations, 
Chinese military officers were pressed to explain when China would build a 
carrier� Many Chinese citizens offered their own funds to support construction 
of an aircraft carrier�75 China’s 
first Soviet-era aircraft carrier, 
the former Minsk, was a popu-
lar tourist attraction—33,000 
visitors toured the ship in just 
seven days during the 2006 
Chinese New Year holiday�76 
Talk shows on China Central Television (CCTV) focused on the merits of an 
aircraft carrier; the popularity of the subject led CCTV to air additional programs 
on the subject� Among the most popular CCTV television programs at that time 
was The Rise of the Great Powers� It stimulated widespread public discussion over 
the lessons of history for China’s emergence as a great power� According to the 
documentary, all successful great powers have possessed a large blue-water navy, 
with large capital ships�77 In 2009, a Chinese foreign affairs weekly reported on 
the widespread national conversation focused on “the long-held dream of so 
many people” that China would “build its own aircraft carrier�”78 Since then, Xi 
has expanded the pace of Chinese carrier production�
China’s recent maritime impatience and boldness reflect Xi’s personal ambi-
tion and impatience to resist any challenge to Chinese interests and to restore 
China’s great-power status� In the brief span of the fifteen months from late 2012 
to early 2013, shortly after he assumed authority over Chinese security policy, 
Xi led China to establish routine maritime presence within twelve miles of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, thus actively challenging Japanese sovereignty; an-
nounce an air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea; occupy the 
Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea; explore for oil in 
disputed waters in the South China Sea for the first time since 1994; challenge 
Vietnamese maritime activities in the South China Sea, contributing to height-
ened tension and a crisis atmosphere in Sino-Vietnamese relations; challenge, 
more frequently and more assertively, U�S� air and naval surveillance activities 
in the South China Sea; and carry out extensive land-reclamation activities in 
[T]he United States did not face a serious 
great-power challenge to its maritime rise 
in the Western Hemisphere. China’s rise as 
a maritime power faces very different great-
power politics.
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disputed areas of the South China Sea, and subsequently construct air and naval 
facilities on its artificial islands�
Accompanying these developments in East Asia is the determined expansion 
of the global presence of the PLA Navy (PLAN)� Under Xi’s leadership, in 2017 
the PLAN carried out its first live-fire exercises in the Mediterranean Sea and its 
first joint exercise with the Russian navy, in the Baltic Sea� In 2017, China also 
reached agreement with Djibouti for the PLAN to establish its first overseas naval 
facility: a logistical support base in East Africa for its operations in the western 
Indian Ocean�79
Geopolitics and the Rise of the Chinese Navy
China’s rapidly expanding naval capabilities and its maritime activism attest to its 
resolve to challenge U�S� maritime supremacy in East Asia and become a world-
class naval power� As China goes to sea, will its fate resemble the failed national-
ist ambitions of France under Louis-Napoléon and of Wilhelmine Germany, or 
the successes of the United States when it emerged as a naval power? The fate 
of China’s naval ambitions, as was the case with the United States, France, and 
Germany, ultimately will depend on the country’s geopolitical circumstances�
In important respects, China’s contemporary geopolitical circumstances 
resemble U�S� geopolitical circumstances in the 1890s and the early twentieth 
century� In the decades since the end of the Cold War China has established 
overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors along its entire periph-
ery� China is bordered by fourteen countries, but none can challenge Chinese 
territorial security� After decades of Chinese modernization of its ground-force 
capabilities, China’s smaller neighbors, including Vietnam, cannot pose even a 
minor challenge to Chinese security� India is a great power in South Asia, but 
over the past thirty years the gap between India and rising China has increased 
significantly� In contrast to China, India in military affairs remains dependent on 
imported platforms for both its navy and its air force� Moreover, the Himalayas 
pose a formidable check on India’s ability to threaten Chinese territory, and thus 
on the outbreak of a major war on the Sino-Indian border� In economics, recently 
India’s annual GDP growth rate has surpassed China’s GDP growth rate� But 
because China’s GDP is five times the size of India’s, even should China’s annual 
growth in GDP maintain the relatively “slow” rate of 7 percent and India’s main-
tain 8 percent growth through 2020, China still will add another “three Indias” 
to its GDP in that time�80
China’s only neighbor that conceivably might pose a threat to Chinese se-
curity is Russia� But since the end of the Cold War, in Northeast Asia Russian 
military and economic capabilities have declined dramatically vis-à-vis China’s� 
In 1991, there were fourteen million Russians living in the Far East, but in 2010 
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the Russian census found that fewer than 6�3 million Russians lived there�81 In-
frastructure in the Far East also has suffered since the end of the Cold War� Lack 
of Russian investment has contributed to a deterioration of electrical-power 
facilities and transportation networks� Russian ports in Northeast Asia have 
fallen behind global standards� Overall, the Far East economy is far poorer than 
the Russian economy west of the Urals, and at best has stagnated over the past 
twenty-five years� Russia has called for China to help with the development of the 
Far East economy, contributing to Russian dependence on China�82
Russian military power also has declined� Despite successful Russian ground-
force actions in Georgia and Ukraine, much of the Russian military remains 
backward and poorly trained� For much of the post–Cold War period the Russian 
navy was in decline� Although in recent years it has received increased funding, 
its shipbuilding has focused on frigates and cruisers that lack adequate defenses 
and primarily are limited to coastal-defense operations�83 But even this limited 
recent expansion of the Russian fleet has been hampered by the poor state of the 
Russian shipbuilding industry� Russian observers acknowledge that the navy’s 
shipyards are in difficult shape and require significant funding, contributing to 
extended delays in delivering new ships� In 2017, of the Russian navy’s twenty-
four major surface ships, only three had been constructed since the end of the 
Cold War� Overall, the decline in Russia’s defense industry is significant� Only 20 
percent of its defense companies can be modernized in an economical way�84 Yet 
the Russian defense budget has declined in recent years, reflecting the absence 
of reform of the Russian economy, the extended decline in GDP growth, and 
Western sanctions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention 
in Ukraine� Budget problems have compelled Russia to delay development of a 
next-generation destroyer and aircraft carrier� In 2018, the Russian military bud-
get declined by 20 percent compared with 2017’s�85 According to Russian sources, 
in 2017 China’s defense budget was three times that of Russia’s�86
Russia’s military decline has become especially apparent in the Far East� Its 
intervention in Ukraine and NATO’s subsequent renewal of ground-force and 
naval exercises on Russia’s periphery have compelled Russia to concentrate much 
of its limited force capabilities on the growing U�S�/NATO challenge to Russian 
security, thus weakening further the Russian strategic presence in the Far East�87 
China, on the other hand, has developed advanced ground-force and naval 
technologies and platforms that contribute to the growth of its full-spectrum 
conventional superiority over the Russian military in Northeast Asia� Moreover, 
just south of the Sino-Russian border China enjoys the benefits of plentiful arable 
land and rapid industrial growth� In its northeast, China has developed a mod-
ern economy, an increasingly well-educated and capable population, advanced 
and well-trained ground-force capabilities, and a sophisticated high-technology 
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infrastructure� Moscow cannot patrol its borders, so the Sino-Russian border can 
be as porous to Chinese migration and trade as it was for most of the nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century, when 80 percent of the civilians in Vladi-
vostok were Chinese or Korean�88 In the twenty-first century, China’s stronger 
commercial presence in the Far East challenges the economic integration of the 
Far East with the rest of Russia�89 China’s domination of the Sino-Russian border 
has increased since the end of the Cold War�
Overall, the gap between Chinese and Russian underlying economic great-
power capabilities has widened in the twenty-first century� The significant dif-
ference between Chinese and Russian GDP growth rates over the past twenty-
five years has contributed to the widening of the Sino-Russian economic and 
technological gaps� Moreover, Russia has yet to reform its economy; it has been 
content to rely on oil revenues to sustain economic growth� The prospects for 
relative improvement in Russia’s economic situation have not improved� More 
recently, the new international sources of gas and oil and the resulting drop in 
world energy prices, combined with NATO’s economic retaliation against Russia 
for its intervention in Ukraine, contributed to the onset of a Russian recession� 
This recession, or stagnation, is likely to endure for many years, thus postponing 
further Russia’s ability to develop sustained economic growth and to field a strong 
military in the Russian Far East�90 Russian defense spending as a share of GDP is 
already more than double Chinese defense spending as a share of GDP�91 Russia 
cannot contend with China in an arms competition�
The decline of Russian capabilities in Northeast Asia diminishes the necessity 
for Beijing to allocate significant resources to defend its northern border� Chi-
nese analysts have minimal concern that Russia will reemerge as an East Asian 
great power that can challenge Chinese security�92 Thus, in terms of the domestic 
security of the great power, the Sino-Russian border increasingly resembles the 
U�S�-Canadian border�
Therefore, along its entire mainland periphery China’s strategic circumstances 
resemble U�S� strategic circumstances in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, when American nationalism promoted the development of the 
United States as a global naval power, rather than the geopolitical circumstances 
that contributed to the demise of French and German nationalist naval ambi-
tions� Consolidated Chinese border security has allowed China to allocate an in-
creasing share of its growing defense budget to developing a large, modern naval 
force, thus enabling the development of great-power capabilities that can chal-
lenge U�S� maritime hegemony�93 The PLA’s 2015 defense white paper on China’s 
military strategy reported that China’s “traditional mentality that land outweighs 
sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the 
seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests�” Thus, China’s navy 
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“will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of 
‘offshore-waters defense’ with ‘open-seas protection�’”94 Insofar as China’s defense 
budget consumes a mere 2 percent of its GDP, China can expand its naval budget 
significantly with minimal repercussions for the Chinese economy�95
The Rise of the Chinese Navy and U.S.-Chinese Competition
Thus, in many respects, China’s geopolitical circumstances resemble the Ameri-
can geopolitical circumstances that facilitated the U�S� effort to dominate the 
Caribbean Sea and ultimately the Western Hemisphere� China possesses the con-
tinental security and the growing economy that will enable it to fund a large and 
modern naval force without undermining Chinese continental border security�
But in one important respect China’s geopolitical circumstances are different 
from those of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century� The United 
States peacefully rose to be a great naval power and to exert hemispheric hege-
mony because the established global powers faced more-pressing issues in their 
home theater� Between 1895 and 1905, both Britain and Germany ceded the Ca-
ribbean Sea to U�S� naval hegemony because they faced threats to their territorial 
integrity from other European powers, so they could not afford conflict in distant 
regions� Britain, the established global power, withdrew its fleet to European 
waters, and Germany, the rising global power, never thought to challenge the 
United States in the Caribbean Sea� Thus, in effect, the United States did not face 
a serious great-power challenge to its maritime rise in the Western Hemisphere�
China’s rise as a maritime power faces very different great-power politics� The 
United States, the established maritime power in East Asia, does not face a chal-
lenge in the Western Hemisphere to either its continental or maritime security� 
Similarly, European countries are not dependent on a major U�S� presence in 
Europe to contend with Russian military power� U�S� security interests outside 
East Asia thus do not require the United States to concede Chinese maritime he-
gemony in East Asia� On the contrary, China’s maritime rise in East Asia already 
has encountered significant U�S� resistance� The U�S� “pivot to Asia” during the 
Barack Obama presidency, including the strengthening of the U�S� naval pres-
ence in East Asia, reflected U�S� concern about rising Chinese naval power and 
the American intention to balance the rise of China and strengthen U�S�–East 
Asian alliances� Similarly, during the Donald Trump administration, U�S� defense 
policy has focused on expanding the size of the U�S� Navy to contend with China’s 
expanding fleet� U�S� development of advanced-technology weapons reflects 
the country’s growing concern for the maritime balance of power in East Asia� 
U�S� researches on laser weapons, the rail gun, carrier-based attack and recon-
naissance unmanned aerial vehicles, underwater antisubmarine and antimine 
drones, long-range antiship cruise missiles, range extensions for U�S� carrier-
based aircraft, and ship-based antiship cruise missiles all reflect the U�S� effort to 
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contend with the rise of China’s navy� Similarly, heightened U�S� resistance since 
2013 to China’s legal claims and its land-reclamation activities in the South China 
Sea reflects U�S� efforts to bolster its regional strategic partnerships as China has 
developed greater naval power�
Thus, despite similar continental geopolitical circumstances, the great-
power consequences of the rise of China in East Asia may be very different from 
the great-power consequences of the rise of the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere� America’s peaceful rise reflected the strategic priorities that the 
established great powers, especially Great Britain, faced in distant regions� As 
China rises, it will not enjoy such fortunate geopolitical circumstances� Rather, 
America’s strategic priority will be balancing the rise of China in East Asia� This 
suggests that the rise of China in the twenty-first century may elicit far greater 
instability and great-power competition and tension, including crises and arms 
races, than the instability and tension elicited by the rise of the United States at 
the turn of the twentieth century�
This historical comparative analysis of case studies of great-power maritime ex-
pansionism suggests that naval nationalism, not realist strategic considerations or 
an unrelenting drive for security or immediate national security interests, drives 
costly revisionist impulses and strategically counterproductive naval acquisitions 
that distract from realist policy making and frequently contribute to significant 
strategic setbacks� Such nationalist dynamics explain not only the costly failures 
of the French and German maritime ambitions discussed in this article but also 
the failed ambitions of France in the early nineteenth century during the Napole-
onic Wars, Russian maritime ambitions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Japan’s maritime ambitions in the 1930s, and the Soviet Union’s mari-
time ambitions in the 1970s and 1980s�96
In the twentieth century, the United States was the exception to this histori-
cal pattern� Nationalism drove its naval expansionism, but its successful rise as a 
global maritime power reflected the benefits neither of nationalism nor of real-
ist, threat-based strategic planning� Instead, U�S� success as a rising naval power 
occurred despite the potentially detrimental effects of American nationalism� 
Given America’s single-minded expansionist ambitions and its ambitious naval 
acquisition program during the Roosevelt administration, fortuitous strategic 
circumstances best explain America’s early maritime successes�
In the twenty-first century, China is the rising power that is challenging the 
great-power status quo� To a significant degree, its naval ambitions and its re-
visionist strategic impatience are driven by the convergence of growing mass 
nationalism and nationalist leadership� Nonetheless, unlike France and Germany, 
China possesses the necessary geopolitical circumstances that allowed the United 
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States to become a maritime great power� It does not face a significant continental 
threat to its security� But unlike the United States, China likely will face resistance 
to a revised regional security order from the established maritime power, the 
United States� Thus, China’s fortuitous geopolitical circumstances and the likeli-
hood of continued economic growth, even at lower annual rates, probably will 
enable it to challenge U�S� maritime hegemony, but in doing so it will contribute 
to heightened great-power conflict, with implications for the global security or-
der and the prospects of great-power war instead of peace�
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